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DISAGGREGATION IN DETERRENCE
AND DEATH PENALTY RESEARCH:




The proper role, if any, of capital punishment in our criminal jus-
tice system is an issue of unparalleled discussion in professional litera-
ture. Over one thousand books, articles, and reports on one or more
aspects of the death penalty question have appeared since the turn of
the century. In addition, the death penalty debate is not confined solely
to professional circles; it occupies a prominent role in the popular press,
media, and periodicals. In fact, the literature is so voluminous and the
moral, legal, ethical, and empirical issues involved are so diverse and
complex, that even the most recognized contemporary authorities on
capital punishment readily acknowledge the limitations of their knowl-
edge and understanding.'
The death penalty issue that is the focus of the greatest discussion
and polarization both in professional and lay literature is the question of
deterrence: does capital punishment deter crime, and most notably,
murder? More properly and practically stated, does capital punishment
provide a more effective general deterrent to murder than alternative
legal sanctions such as imprisonment?
Social scientists-most notably sociologists and criminologists-
have played a long and active role in addressing this question empiri-
cally, with all studies up until the mid-1970's rejecting the deterrence
hypothesis for capital punishment. For example, over five decades of
research in this country failed to show higher murder rates in abolition
than death penalty states, an increase in the murder rate after some
states abolished capital punishment, or a decrease in murder after some
* Professor of Sociology, Cleveland State University; Ph.D., Sociology, Washington State
University, 1971; B.S., Central Washington State University, 1966.
I H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1982); T. SELLIN, THE PENALTY
OF DEATH (1980).
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jurisdictions reinstated the death penalty, all of which the deterrence
hypothesis predicts. 2 In addition, both longitudinal and cross-sectional
examinations of actual execution rates and murder rates in retentionist
jurisdictions failed to show a significant inverse relationship between
these two factors as the deterrence hypothesis predicts.
3
These studies, along with additional anecdotal information from
noted prison wardens and chaplains, 4 psychiatrists, 5 and convicted mur-
derers6 brought most social scientists to what Sellin has termed the "in-
evitable" conclusion that capital punishment, in either law or practice,
has no discernible effect as a deterrent to murder. 7 The prevailing opin-
ion was expressed by Barnes and Teeters when they claimed that deter-
rence justifications for capital punishment are but "rationalizations of
revenge."8
Despite the presumed conclusiveness of the evidence against the
death penalty as a deterrent to murder,9 and the anti-capital punish-
ment attitude held by most social scientists, the deterrence question be-
came a lively area of debate in the professional literature during the
middle of the last decade. At least four major factors appear to be re-
sponsible for the return of the deterrence question to prominence in the
social science and legal literature during this period: ' 0 (1) a growing the-
oretical and empirical interest in the general deterrence doctrine, which
stemmed in large part from Gibbs"I and Becker's 12 critiques of the anti-
punishment and anti-deterrence attitudes held by many social scientists;
(2) a growing awareness of the theoretical and methodological complex-
2 H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (rev. ed. 1967); R. BYE, CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1919); C. KIRKPATRICK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1925); T.
SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959); Dann, The Deterrent Efect of Capital Punishment, 29
FRIENDS SoC. SERV. REV. 1 (1935); Reckless, The Use of the Death Penalty, 15 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 43 (1969); Schuessler, The Deterrent Inftence of the Death Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54 (1952);
Sutherland, Murder and the Death Penalty, 15 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 522
(1925); Void, Can the Death Penalty Prevent Crime?, 12 PRISON J., Oct. 1932, at 4.
3 T. SELLIN, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT (1967); Bailey, Murder and Capital Punishment: Some
Further Evidence, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 669 (1975); Schuessler, supra note 2.
4 C. DUFFY & A. HIRSHBERG, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN (1962); L. LAWES, MAN'S JUDG-
MENT OF DEATH (1924).
5 D. J. WEST, MURDER FOLLOWED BY SUICIDE (1965).
6 C. CHESSMAN, CELL 2455, DEATH Row (1954).
7 T. SELLIN, supra note 3, at 138 (1967).
8 H. E. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 355 (1951).
9 A contrary view cannot be found in a simple criminology textbook published in this
country from the turn of the century up until the mid-1970's.
10 See generally, H. BEDAU, supra note 1; T. SELLIN, supra note 1; Bailey, Deterrence and the
Celerity of the Death Penalty: A Neglected Question in Deterrence Research, 58 Soc. FORCES 1308
(1980); Gibbs, Preventive Eects of Capital Punishment Other Than Deterrence, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 34
(1978).
11 Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 Sw. Soc. ScL Q. 515 (1968).
12 Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
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ity of the deterrence issue and the serious shortcomings (both theoretical
and methodological) of previous deterrence studies; (3) complaints by
the United States Supreme Court in two important decisions 13 about
the lack of recent, clear-cut evidence on the deterrent effect of capital
punishment; and (4) the publication of a highly controversial article by
Isaac Ehrlich in 1975 which (a) dismissed as methodologically naive and
meaningless over five decades of previous death penalty research, and
(b), of equal importance, reported certainty of execution to be a very
significant deterrent to murder.' 4 Examining national execution and
homicide data for various periods between 1933 and 1969, Ehrlich con-
cluded that "an additional execution per year over the period in ques-
tion may have resulted on average, in 7 or 8 fewer murders."'
5
Moreover, in a study which followed soon after Ehrlich's and which
used similar econometric techniques to examine national murder and
execution data for various periods between 1933 and 1972, Yunker
reached the conclusion that "one execution will deter 156 murders."'
16
While both Ehrlich's and Yunker's studies have come under intense
scrutiny and are now considered totally discredited by most authori-
ties, 17 their work and the additional factors noted above brought to the
forefront an awareness of the complexity of the deterrence question and
the need for a more sophisticated methodology than was employed in
earlier studies.
II. SUMMARY OF RECENT RESEARCH
The mid-1970's saw a movement in research on the deterrent value
of the death penalty away from the traditional practice of simply exam-
ining the bivariate relationship between (1) the presence or absence of
capital punishment and variation in state homicide rates, and/or (2) the
13 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14 Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effict of Capital Punishment." A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
15 Id. at 414.
16 Yunker, Is the Death Penalty a Deterrent to Homicide? Some Tme Series Evidence, 5 J. BEHAV.
ECON., Summer 1976, at 45.
17 See, e.g., Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlichs Research on Capital
Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975); Brier & Fienberg, Recent Econometric Modeling of Crime and
Punishment- Support for the Deterrence Hypothesis?, 4 EVALUATION REV. 147 (1980); Forst, The
Deterrent Efetc of Capital Punishment.- A Cross-State Analysis of the 1960s, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743
(1977); Friedman, The Use of Aultiple Regression Anaysis to Test for a Deterrent E ct of Capital
Punishment: Prospects andProblems, in 1 CRIMINOLOGY REVIEW YEARBOOK 61 (S. Messinger &
E. Bittner eds. 1979); Klein, Forst & Filatov, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An As-
sessment of the Estimates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS
OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978);
Passell & Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 AM. EON. REV.
445 (1977); P. Passell & J. Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another
View (Feb. 1975) (unpublished manuscript).
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simple correlation between execution rates and homicide rates for death
penalty jurisdictions. It became apparent that an adequate test of the
deterrence hypothesis would have to incorporate as control variables ad-
ditional factors associated with murder rates to properly identify the
possible effect of the provision and level of use of the death penalty.18
To do otherwise is to examine murder in an etiological vacuum and run
the risk of spurious results.
Thus, the second half of the 1970's through 1980 saw over a dozen
multivariate deterrence studies. 19 These studies were primarily of two
forms: (1) cross-sectional examinations of state execution and murder
rates for selected years,20 or (2) time-series analyses of the relationship
between execution and murder rates at either the national or state
level.
2 1
With but two exceptions, 22 this new round of research found no
support for the hypothesis that either the provision for capital punish-
ment or the certainty of execution had a significant deterrent effect on
murder. Moreover, some investigations attempted to replicate and ver-
ify Ehrlich's opposite findings.23 In general, the conclusion was that
Ehrlich's confirmation of the deterrence hypothesis was simply a result
of his applying a number of arbitrary, and in some cases dubious, as-
sumptions and procedures in his analysis.
2 4
18 Ehrlich made this clear in 1975. Ehrlich, supra note 14.
19 These studies typically used multiple regression.
20 Bailey, supra note 10; Bailey, A Multivariate Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Deterrent E ect of
the Death Penalty, 69 Soc. & Soc. RESEARCH 183 (1980); Bailey, Imprisonment v. the Death Pen-
alty as a Deterrent to Murder, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 239 (1977); Black & Orsagh, New Evidence
on the Effcay of Sanctions as Deterrent to Homicide, 58 Soc. Sci. Q. 616 (1978); Ehrlich, Capital
Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. EcON. 741
(1977); Forst, supra note 17; Kleck, Capital Punishment, Gun Ownership, and Homicide, 84 AM. J.
Soc. 882 (1979); Passell, The Deterrent Eect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 61 (1975); Yunker, supra note 16.
21 Bailey, The Deterrent Eect of the Death Penalty: An Extended Time-Series Analysis, 10
OMEGA 235 (1979-80); Bailey, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty for Murder in Ohio: A Time-
Series Analysis, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 51 (1979); Bailey, Deterrent Eect of he Death Penalty for
Murder in Caifornia, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 743 (1979); Bailey, Deterrence and the Death Penalty for
Murder in Oregon, 16 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 67 (1979); Bailey, An Analysis of the Deterrent Ejfect of
the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 29 (1978); Bailey, Deterrence and the Death
Penaltyjor Murder in Utah: A Time-Series Analysis, 5 J. CONTEMP. L. 1 (1978); Bowers & Pierce,
Deterrence or Brutalization: What Is the Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453 (1980);
Bowers & Pierce, supra note 17; King, The Brutalization Efect: Execution Publicity and the Incidence
of Homicide in South Carolina, 57 Soc. FORCES 683 (1978); Kleck, supra note 20; Klein, Forst &
Filatov, supra note 17; Passell & Taylor, supra note 17; W. Bowers & G. Pierce, Deterrence,
Brutalization or Nonsense? (1975) (unpublished manuscript).
22 Ehrlich, supra note 20; Yunker, supra note 16.
23 Ehrlich, supra note 14.
24 W. Bowers & G. Pierce, supra note 21 (unpublished manuscript); Bowers & Pierce, supra
note 17, at 187-208; Brier & Fienberg, supra note 17; Friedman, supra note 17; Klein, Forst &
Filatov, supra note 17; Passell & Taylor, supra note 17.
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By the same token, however, a number of recent investigators are
quick to point out that, despite these rather consistent findings, there is
also no conclusive evidence that capital punishment is not, or cannot be,
an effective deterrent to murder. 25 Although the evidence to date does
not, on balance, show a significant deterrent effect, even recent death
penalty research suffers from some important methodological limita-
tions that prevent us from concluding that capital punishment does not
have a significant deterrent effect on murder. Until these remaining
methodological issues are resolved, 26 the deterrence question will remain
an unresolved matter.
27
III. PROBLEMS OF AGGREGATION AND MEASUREMENT BIAS
In at least three important areas, both earlier and more recent de-
terrence studies suffer from bias because of the highly aggregated nature
of the data being examined. 28 First, with few exceptions, the only type
of homicide subject to the death penalty is premeditated murder.
29
However, not a single deterrence study has examined the relationship
between the provision and/or level of use of capital punishment and
first-degree murder rates. Rather, previous studies typically either (1)
operationalized their dependent variable as homicide, and have made use
of figures compiled by the United States Public Health Service, or (2)
operationalized their dependent variable as murder and non-negligent man-
slaughter, and made use of data compiled by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI). This practice is necessary because no public or
private agency gathers nationwide data on premeditated murder.
30
In using the more inclusive homicide and murder data in death
25 Brier & Fienberg, supra note 17; Friedman, supra note 17; Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra
note 17.
26 Most of these issues involve potential problems of aggregation and measurement bias.
See infra notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
27 N. KITTRIE & E. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 31 (1981);
Brier & Fienberg, supra note 17 at 187-88; Friedman, supra note 17, at 71-85; Klein, Forst &
Filatov, supra note 17, at 357-59.
28 N. KITTRIE & E. ZENOFF, supra note 27, at 341.
29 Premeditated murder is variously referred to as first-degree murder, murder I, and ag-
gravated murder.
30 In state statutes, first-degree murder typically includes both the elements of premedita-
tion and malice aforethought. In general terms, premeditation refers to an intent to violate
the law which is formulated prior to the activity, while malice aforethought refers to the
simple presence of an intent to kill at the time of the act. The homicide category of murder
and non-negligent manslaughter used by the FBI includes "all willful felonious homicides as
distinguished from deaths caused by negligence," FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES-UNIFORM CRIME REPORT-1967, AT 61 (1968), AND THE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE defines homicide as "a death resulting from an injury purposely
inflicted by another person," with intent to kill not required to classify a death as a homicide.
U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1950-1964 at 9 (1967).
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penalty studies, it is commonly assumed that the ratio of first degree
murders to homicides or murder and non-negligent manslaughters is
constant, so that the latter types of figures provide a reasonably good
indicator of capital offenses. As Sellin 3 I and Bedau32 have pointed out,
however, this is only an assumption. There is no hard evidence to justify
this practice. Accordingly, until more refined murder data are ex-
amined, the extent of bias present in previous studies will remain an
important but unresolved question.
33
A second potential area of bias in death penalty studies stems from
the type of political/geographic bodies used as the units of analysis or
measurement. For instance, in a number of recent studies researchers
have examined the correspondence between aggregate execution rates
and homicide or murder rates on a national level for various time peri-
ods, most commonly from the 1930's through the late 1960's. These
studies are seriously flawed because no attention has been paid to (1) the
tremendous state-to-state variation in offense rates during these years,
(2) the considerable variation in execution rates from state to state in
retentionist jurisdictions, and the fact that execution rates, by definition,
were zero in abolitionist states, and (3) the tremendous variation from
state to state in the sociodemographic and other control variables intro-
duced into the analysis. These studies have simply treated this impor-
tant variation as if it does not exist. Moreover, and with particular
reference to Ehrlich's study,34 measurement error problems for an execu-
tion rate variable are very serious when homicide and execution data
are aggregated at the national level. In such a situation, even slight
measurement error may contribute to a spurious negative relationship
between execution and murder rates.
3 5
Because of these problems, it appears that states are a preferable
unit of analysis in time-series as well as cross-sectional designs. Even
aggregation at the state level, however, may result in substantial error
and possible bias.36 For example, it has long been observed that murder
rates are much higher in some areas of a state than in others,3 7 but com-
31 T. SELLIN, supra note 3, at 135.
32 H. Bedau, supra note 2, at 36.
33 N. KrrrRIE & E. ZENOFF, supra note 27; Brier & Feinberg, supra note 17; Friedman,
supra note 17; Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 17.
34 Ehrlich, supra note 14.
35 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 17; Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence, Brutalization or Nonsense?,
supra note 21; Brier & Fienberg, supra note 17; Friedman, supra note 17; Klein, Forst & Fi-
latov, supra note 17; Passell & Taylor, supra note 17.
36 Greenberg, Deterrence Research and Social Poliy, in MODELING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (S. Nagel ed. 1977); Logan, Arrest Rates and Deterrence, 56 Soc. ScI. Q. 376 (1975);
Orsagh, Empirical Criminologv: Interpreting Results Derivedfrom Aggregate Data, 16 J. RESEARCH
CRIME & DELINQ. 294 (1979).
37 For example, there are often such differences between urban and rural areas of a state.
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puting murder rates at the state level disguises this important variation.
Similarly, the ratio of executions to murders varies considerably be-
tween areas within many retentionist states,38 but aggregate execution
rates ignore this variation. Finally, the very same difficulties are present
when sociodemographic and other control variables are measured at the
state level, and this is particularly a problem when very heterogeneous
jurisdictions are considered.
The possibility of bias in using state-wide data is confirmed by a
recent study by Greenberg, Kessler, and Logan, 39 which found that the
relationship between arrest rates and rates for major felonies (including
murder) varies considerably depending upon whether states or cities are
used as the unit of analysis. The study found considerable aggregation
bias in the state level analysis. 40 It remains to be seen, however, whether
this pattern holds when cities are used as the unit of analysis in death
penalty studies. Such an analysis is the next logical step in death pen-
alty research.
41
A third source of potential aggregation and measurement bias
comes from the typical practice of using one-year time intervals (nor-
mally the calendar year) in computing murder and execution rates and
examining the correspondence between them. This practice is necessary
because homicide and murder data available for death penalty studies
are generally only reported on a calendar year basis, rather than a
monthly, weekly or daily basis. Similarly, until the publication of the
complete Teeters-Zibulka Inventory of executions under state author-
ity,42 only annual execution figures were available from periodic publi-
cations released by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
The primary problems that result from examining yearly execution
and offense data are threefold. First, -the deterrent effect of capital pun-
ishment may be short-term and have its major impact on the rate of
murder within the month or two after execution.43 This remains an
open question, but if this is the case, then examining yearly murder data
will have the effect of disguising or diluting the impact of executions.
38 W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 202-401 (1974).
39 Greenberg, Kessler & Logan, Aggregation Bias in Deterrence Research: An Empirical Analy-
sir, 18 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQ. 128 (1981).
40 For the same reasons, a growing number of investigators have moved from using states
to using either cities or counties as their units of analysis in examining the deterrent effect of
arrest and imprisonment practices. Brown, Arrest Rates and Crime Rates: When Does a To'ping
Effect Occur?, 57 Soc. FORCES 671 (1978); Greenberg, Kessler & Logan, supra note 39; Green-
berg, Kessler & Logan, A Panel Model of Crime Rates and Arrest Rates, 44 AM. Soc. REV. 843
(1979); Tittle & Rowe, Certainty ofArrests and Crime Rates. A Further Test of the Deterrence Hypothe-
sis, 52 Soc. FORCES 455 (1974).
41 N. Kittrie & E. Zenoff, supra note 27, at 341.
42 W. BOWERS, supra note 38, at 200.
43 Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization, supra note 21.
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Second, when executions and murders are considered on a calendar
year basis, it becomes very difficult to properly establish the temporal
sequence between these two factors. To illustrate, it would make little
sense to expect an execution carried out during December of year t to be
much evidenced in the annual twelve-month murder rate for year t.
This is obvious because eleven months worth of murders during year t
occurred before the execution. Rather, the deterrent effect of such an
execution could only be felt during December of year t and possibly, for
the reasons noted above, during the first few months of year t + 1.
Some investigators have tried to deal with the possible delayed de-
terrent effect of executions by building in a one-year time lag between
executions (year t) and murders (year t + 1). However, whether this
procedure is employed in a time-series or cross-sectional design, the diffi-
culty is the same: there is no assurance that the actual time lag between
executions and the murder rate is the same. To illustrate, for both State
A and State B, murder rates for year t + 1 are being examined, but the
last execution during year t in State A may have been in January,
whereas the last execution during year t in State B may have been in
December. Here, the actual time lags being considered for the two hypo-
thetical states differ by about one year. This is obviously an extreme
example posing the maximum possible difference. The fact remains,
however, that states have been far from uniform in their monthly execu-
tion practices, 44 and the possible bias resulting from previous studies
which rely upon yearly execution and murder data cannot be ignored.
IV. THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION
In this investigation we attempt to overcome each of the above ag-
gregation and measurement error problems by providing a monthly
time-series analysis of executions and first-degree murders in the city of
Chicago, Illinois for the period 1915-1921. 45 Although these first-degree
murder and execution data are now somewhat dated, their importance
in providing a clearer understanding of the possible deterrent effect of
executions on capital homicides is not diminished. Moreover, if deter-
rence is a communication effect as Gibbs46 and others contend, then
Chicago provides an ideal research setting since there is close geographic
proximity between the place where first-degree murders are committed
44 Teeters & Zibulka, Executions Und r State Authority: 1864-1967, in W. BOWERS, EXECU-
TIONS IN AMERICA 200, 202 (1974).
45 This analysis is made possible by the availability of unpublished execution figures for
Cook County Prison compiled by Hans Mattrick, its former assistant warden, which have
been provided to me by Thorsten Sellin, and monthly first-degree murder data covering the
seven-year period reported by the Chicago Police Department in its annual reports.
46 j. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1975).
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and the place where the convicted murderers are executed. In many
states, executions are performed in facilities that are far removed from
major population centers where the majority of murders occur. In con-
trast, in Chicago every convicted murderer executed during the period
under study was put to death in the Cook County Prison located in the
city. Accordingly, Chicago residents, including would-be killers, should
have had a more direct awareness of murder and its possible conse-
quence (the certainty of execution) than residents of larger jurisdictions
such as states or the nation.
A. METHODS AND PROCEDURES
1. Method of Analsis
In examining the deterrent effect of executions on first-degree
murders in Chicago, we use the following general model:
47
FM = (EXEC, ARR, PRIS, DEN, PUB, SEA).
This model represents the hypothesis that the monthly number of first-
degree murders (FM) is a function of the number of executions for first-
degree murder (EXEC); the certainty of arrest for murder I (ARR); the
certainty of imprisonment for murder I (PRIS); population density
(DEN); the percent of the city's budget expended on public assistance
for the homeless and other needy adults and children (PUB); and the
season of the year (SEA). Previous research has found sociodemographic
and seasonal variables included on the right-hand side of the equation,
or similar ones, to be associated with murder rates, and they are consid-
47 Although we pose, theoretically, deterrence as the causal connection between executions
and murder, Gibbs, supra note 10, claims that the normative validation effect of executions also
has to be considered. See J. GIBBS, supra note 46. Normative validation "occurs when an
individual's condemnation of some type of criminal act is maintained as a consequence of
prescribed legal punishments or their application to other individuals." Gibbs, supra note 10,
at 40. In the case of capital punishment, executions could affect, theoretically, the rate of
murder either through deterrence or normative validation. That is, both arguments predict
an inverse relationship between the level of executions and the level of murder. W. BERNS,
FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY 145
(1979); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL
QUESTION 70 (1975); Lehtinen, The Value of Life: An Argument for the Death Penalty, 23 CRIME
& DELINQ. 237 (1977); van den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 60 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 141 (1969). According to Gibbs, supra note 10, and Brier &
Fienberg, supra note 17, however, there apparently is no feasible way of separating the possi-
ble deterrent from normative validation effects of capital punishment.
Whereas Gibbs, supra notes 10 & 46, is adamant in drawing a distinction between the
deterrent and normative validation effects of sanctions, most researchers have adopted a more
flexible conceptualization that incorporates both deterrence and normative validation under
the phrase "general deterrence." C. TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THE
QUESTION OF DETERRENCE (1980). Because this is the more ,common usage in the death
penalty literature, and for reasons of brevity in our discussion, we shall use the term deter-
rence to also incorporate the possible normative validation effect of executions on murder.
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ered here as control factors to avoid spurious results for the execution
variable. In addition, and for the same reasons, certainty of arrest and
imprisonment for murder are also included in the model as control fac-
tors. Some previous investigations have found certainty of arrest and
imprisonment to be negatively, and significantly, associated with homi-
cide rates.
At first glance, it appears that our model ignores some possibly im-
portant sociodemographic factors associated with murder. For example,
some previous investigations found a very significant relationship be-
tween murder rates and such factors as percent of population that is
nonwhite, percent of male population fifteen to thirty-four years of age,
and percent of population foreign born. These factors were considered
for possible inclusion in our model, but they were rejected because of the
high degree of multicollinearity they would have introduced into the
analysis. The association among these factors would have resulted in
very unreliable parameter estimates coming from the regression
analysis.
48
Although a theoretical argument can be made for including each of
these three sociodemographic factors in the analysis, their high degree of
correspondence precludes including even two of them in the model. In
addition, if we decide to include only one of these variables in the analy-
sis, the obvious questions become which one, and whether the resulting
findings should be interpreted as indicating the effects of race, age/sex,
or foreign born population on murders.
Rather than make such an arbitrary decision, all three factors are
excluded from the model, but their possible effect on murder is not to-
tally ignored. The population density factor included in the model is
very highly correlated with the nonwhite population (r = .950), male
population fifteen to thirty-four years of age (r = -. 969) and the foreign
born population (r = -. 999) variables. Accordingly, population density
can be viewed as a proxy variable for changes in Chicago in these three
sociodemographic areas, besides having its own theoretical justification
for consideration.
To examine the effect of executions on first-degree murders, a series
of multiple regression analyses were performed where various execution
measures and time-lag structures were considered. In addition, more
general monthly homicide figures, similar to those included in the FBI's
category of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, were considered in
the analysis for comparative purposes and to determine the impact of
48 For nonwhite population and male population 15 to 34 years of age, r = -. 991; for
nonwhite population and percent of population foreign born, r = -. 947; for male population
15 to 34 years of age and percent of population foreign born, r = .946.
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executions on total criminal homicides in Chicago.4 9
2. The Dependent Variables
For each year, 1915 through 1921, monthly (n = 84) first-degree
murder figures were taken from the annual statistical reports of the Chi-
cago Police Department.50 Under Illinois law during this period, first-
degree (premeditated) murder was the only type of homicide eligible for
capital punishment. The type of indictment reached by the Cook
County Grand Jury determined how killings were classified in the police
reports.
Figures for total criminal homicides (including first-degree
murders) were also extracted from the annual Chicago police reports in
order to examine the effect of executions on all types of criminal homi-
cides.51 Although most of these homicides would not lead to the death
penalty, the moralizing, normative validation, and educative effect of
executions may also reduce noncapital homicides.52 Indeed, the major
function of the threat and application of criminal law may lie in its
moral and educative role in society.
53
49 To test for possible problems of multicollinearity, we examined our basic model with
each execution variable using the variance decomposition method developed in A. BELSLEY,
E. KUH & R. WELSCH, REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS: IDENTIFYING INFLUENTIAL DATA AND
SOURCES OF COLLINEARITY (1980). This analysis did not indicate any significant col-
linearity problems. Interestingly, population density is the factor most strongly associated
with the number of executions (r = .448) and the execution dummy variable (r'= .453).
However, this does not pose a problem in the analysis either by itself or in linear combination
with the other predictor variables. When the number of executions is regressed against the
other five right-hand variables included in the murder I analysis, a significant (p < .01) R
2
value of .217 results. This compares to an R 2 of .223 (p < .01) when the dummy execution
variable is considered. Similarly, when the number of executions and the dummy execution
variable are regressed against the five right-hand factors considered in the homicide analysis,
significant (p < .01) R 2 values of .216 and .220, respectively, result. These R2 values indicate
that the majority of the variation in each execution measure is not accounted for by any or all
of the other predictor variables. Accordingly, there is no indication that the findings to be
presented for the execution variables in Tables 2-10 suffer from problems of multicollinearity.
In addition, the analysis shows that the other right-hand factors do not suffer from serious
collinearity problems.
50 Only during this seven-year period do the annual reports disaggregate homicide figures
by month and type of killing.
51 With a few slight exceptions, the types of killings included in the criminal homicide
data for Chicago are comparable to the types of killings included in the FBI offense category
of murder and non-negligent manslaughter. See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 30, at 61. Excluded from the Chicago homicide data are a few deaths resulting from
illegal abortions, infant neglect, criminal carelessness with a wagon or automobile, and deaths
resulting from illegally produced alcohol. In addition, 38 killings resulting from the Chicago
race riot of 1919 are excluded from the analysis.
52 E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS, Upra note 21, at 212-13, 225; Lehtinen, The
Value of Life. An Argument for the Death Penalty, 23 CRIME & DE INQ. 237, 240-42 (1977); van
den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, supra note 47, at 143.
53 E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1949); J. GORECKI, A THEORY
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3. Execution Variables
In examining monthly first-degree murders and total criminal
homicides, two execution measures are utilized: (1) the actual number
of monthly executions, and (2) a dummy execution variable, where exe-
cution months are assigned a weight of one (1.0) and non-execution
months a weight of zero (0.0).54 If the public, including would-be kill-
ers, is sensitive to the actual volume of executions via the deterrence
thesis, then the former measure should prove superior to the latter,
which simply reflects the presence or absence of an execution during a
month. Both types of measures have been used by previous investigators
and are considered here for comparative purposes.55
4. Control Variables
The two sociodemographic control variables considered in the anal-
ysis are population density and percent of the city budget expended on
care (food and shelter) for the homeless and other needy adults and chil-
dren. 56 These factors are included in the analysis to control for changes
in the nature of the Chicago population and socioeconomic conditions
during the seven-year period. In addition, the population density varia-
ble has the effect of controlling for changes in population size since the
boundaries of Chicago did not change from 1915 through 192 1.
5 7
Season of the year is also included as a control variable. Investiga-
tions have long found that murder rates are generally higher during the
summer months and in December. The typical explanation for this pat-
tern is that during the summer months and in December (a holiday
month) there is a greater level of social intercourse and alcohol con-
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1979); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968);
F. TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY (1938); P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND
CORRECTION (1960); Andenaes, General Prevention Revisited.- Research and Poliy Implications, 66
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 338 (1975); Andenaes, The GeneralPreventive E4ffcts of Punishment,
114 U. PA. L. REv. 949 (1966); Andenaes, General Prevention: Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 176 (1952).
54 Following the type of procedure used by King, supra note 22, executions during the first
half ofa month were recorded as occurring during the month (month t) and those during the
second half of a month were recorded as occurring during the next month (month t+l).
Short of weekly or daily data for killings, this is as close as the correspondence between execu-
tions and murders or homicides can be approximated.
55 From 1915 through 1921 there were 26 executions for first-degree murder in Chicago;
an average of about one execution every 3.2 months during the 84-month period.
56 The data for these variables come from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Cen-
sus publications and W. SKOGAN, CHICAGO SINCE 1840: A TIME-SERIES DATA HANDBOOK
(1976). Monthly figures were linearly interpolated.
57 Accordingly, it is also not necessary to compute rates for the murder and homicide
variables since inclusion of the population density factor in the analysis controls for changes
in population from 1915 through 1921.
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sumption, two factors that contribute to murder.58 To control for this
possible effect, a seasonal dummy variable was constructed with the
summer months59 and December assigned a weight of one (1.0) and the
remaining months a weight of zero (0.0).
Finally, certainty of arrest and imprisonment for murder are con-
sidered in the analysis as control factors to better isolate the hypothe-
sized deterrent effect of executions. A handful of cross-sectional studies
of cities and states have found evidence that certainty of arrest and im-
prisonment do have at least some degree of deterrent (and/or in-
capacitative) effect on homicides. ° To control for this possibility for
Chicago during the period considered, annual certainty of imprison-
ment values for first-degree murder were computed by the following
formula: certainty = [(No. of imprisonments for murder I / No. of ar-
rests for murder I X 100]. Similarly, when total criminal homicides are
considered as the dependent variable in the analysis, a broader measure
of certainty of imprisonment is utilized: certainty = [(No. of imprison-
ments for homicide / No. of arrests for homicide) X 100]. In computing
these measures, which result in a percent imprisonment figure for each
year for each type of killing, the few cases where the accused was killed,
committed suicide before trial, or was sent to a mental hospital rather
than a penal institution, as well as cases that were pending at the end of
the year without disposition, were excluded from consideration in com-
puting certainty values.61
A similar procedure was also followed in computing annual esti-
mates of the certainty of arrest for first-degree murder: certainty =
[(No. of arrests for murder I / No. murder I killings) X 100]; and the
certainty of arrest for homicide: certainty = [(No. of arrests for homicide
/ No. of homicides) X 100]. Alternative arrest "clearance rate" figures
for either type of killings are not available from Chicago Police Depart-
ment records.
58 E. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 82 (1947).
59 The summer months are June, July, and August.
60 Bean & Cushing, Criminal Homicide, Punishment and Deterrence: Methodological and Substan-
tive Reconsiderations, 52 Soc. Sci. Q. 277 (1971); Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521 (1973); Gibbs, supra note 11; Gray
& Martin, Pumishment and Deterrence: Another Analysis of Gibbs'Data, 50 Soc. ScI. Q. 389 (1969);
Logan, supra note 36; Logan, GeneralDeterrent Efects oflmprisonment, 51 Soc. FORCES 64 (1972);
Tittle & Rowe, supra note 40.
61 Because monthly arrest and imprisonment data are not available for Chicago for either
type of killing, certainty values had to be computed on a yearly basis and used as estimates for
each month falling within the year. We do not see using yearly estimates of certainty as
posing a serious theoretical problem, however, due to the normal delay for those convicted
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Table 1 presents a descriptive profile of the factors included in our
model as well as the zero-order correlations among the variables. To
reiterate, our model predicts a significant negative relationship between
executions and the number of first-degree murders and total criminal
homicides. Table 2 reports the results of an ordinary least squares
(OLS) analysis where the number of monthly first-degree murders is re-
gressed against the number of executions, the execution dummy (0/1)
variable, and the control factors.
TABLE 2
OLS: NUMBER OF MONTHLY FIRST DEGREE MURDERS REGRESSED
AGAINST NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, AN EXECUTION DUMMY VARIA-
BLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-1921*
No. Executions Execution Dummy
Independent Variable B t/F B t/F
Population Density .002 2.547a .002 2.440a
Public Assistance 3.202 .220 3.169 1.222
Season .410 .546 .417 .580
Cert. of Arrest -. 033 -. 919 -. 034 -. 935
Cert. of Prison -. 085 -1.591 -. 086 -. 109
Executions -. 059 -. 101 .114 .119
Constant -14.955 -. 874 -13.843 -. 803
R2 .264 4.62b .265 4.62b
D.W. 1.799 1.804
For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R 2 values, F values are reported.
a = p < .05
b = p < .01
Contrary to the deterrence hypothesis, this analysis provides no evi-
dence that executions are an effective deterrent to first-degree murder.
When the actual number of monthly executions and murders are con-
sidered, these two factors are negatively associated,6 2 as the deterrence
hypothesis predicts. The negative relationship is slight, however, and is
not statistically significant. Moreover, when the execution dummy vari-
able is considered, executions and murders are positively associated.
63
This relationship is also slight, however, and is not statistically
significant.
62 B = -. 059; t = -. 101.
63 B = .114; t= .119.
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Additionally, Table 2 provides no indication that the certainty of
arrest or imprisonment are effective deterrents to first-degree murder.
When both execution measures are considered, the arrest and imprison-
ment coefficients are in the expected negative direction, but they fall
short of reaching statistical significance at the .05 level. In contrast,
population density is a significant predictor of murders in each analysis.
Also of note, the Durbin-Watson (D.W.) statistics allow us to accept
the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation when both the
number of executions and the execution dummy variable are examined.
In addition, the same pattern holds when error structures for lag periods
as far back as t- 12 months are considered. Accordingly, it would appear
that the OLS results reported in Table 2 do not suffer from autocorrela-
tion bias.
TABLE 3
OLS: NUMBER OF MONTHLY HOMICIDES REGRESSED AGAINST
NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, AN EXECUTION DUMMY VARIABLE, AND
OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-1921*
No. Executions Execution Dummy
Independent Variables B t/F B t/F
Population Density -. 001 -1.640 -. 002 -1.932
Public Assistance .507 .139 .437 .120
Season 1.309 1.192 1.340 1.217
Cert. of Arrest -. 149 -2.521a -. 153 -2.572a
Cert. of Prison -. 210 -3.065b -. 216 -3.155b
Executions -. 406 -. 470 .442 .753
Constant 63.236 3.371b 67.897 3.578b
R2 .238 4.Olb .237 3.99b
D. W. 1.582 1.578
* For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mu-
litple R 2 values, F values are reported.
a = p < .05
b = p < .01
Table 3 reports the analysis where the monthly number of criminal
homicides is treated as the dependent variable. The findings for the
execution variables parallel the previous analysis for murder. The
number of executions is negatively associated with homicides, and the
execution dummy variable is positively associated with homicides. In
neither case, however, is the association between these two factors statis-
tically significant.
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Unlike with murder I, both the certainty of arrest and the certainty
of imprisonment are statistically significant predictors of homicides. Re-
gardless of the execution measure used, the greater the certainty of ar-
rest, the lower the number of homicides. Similarly, the greater the
certainty of imprisonment, the lower the number of homicides. These
findings are consistent with what deterrence theory predicts and with
the findings of some previous studies.64 The significant t values for the
arrest and imprisonment variables, however, may be to some degree sus-
pect. For both analyses, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the pres-
ence of a positive first-order serial correlation that has the effect of
producing downwardly biased standard errors and, accordingly, up-
wardly biased t ratios. This could account for the significant t values for
the arrest and imprisonment variables.
Although our primary concern is with the deterrent effect of execu-
tions and not certainty of arrest and imprisonment, the homicide equa-
tions reported in Table 3 were re-estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt
(CORC) iterative procedure for first-order autocorrelation. 65 Results
are reported in Table 4.
TABLE 4
CORC: NUMBER OF MONTHLY HOMICIDES REGRESSED AGAINST
NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, AN EXECUTION DUMMY VARIABLE, AND
OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-1921*
No. Executions Execution Dummy
Independent Variable B t/F B t/F
Population Density -. 001 -1.336 -. 002 -1.471
Public Assistance .901 .204 .830 .188
Season 1.888 1.683a 1.912 1.703a
Cert. of Arrest -. 152 -2.070a -. 155 -2.104a
Cert. of Prison -. 210 -2.544b -. 215 -2.611b
Executions -. 243 -. 311 .215 .170
Constant 62.074 2.726b 64.896 2.832b
R2 .275 4.81b .275 4.79b
D. W. 1.970 1.964
* For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R2 values, F values are reported.
a = p < .05
b p <.01
64 See, e.g., Bailey, Martin & Gray, Crime & Deterrence.4 A Correlation Analysis, 11 J. RE-
SEARCH CRIME & DELINQ. 124 (1974); Gray & Martin, Punishment andDeterrence: Another Anal-
ysisofGibbs'Data, 50 Soc. Sci. Q. 289 (1969); Logan, General Deterrent E jects olmprisonment, 51
Soc. FORCES 64 (1972).
65 To test and correct for serial correlation problems, the SAS (Statistical Analysis Sys-
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This reanalysis does not alter the basic findings for the sanction
variables. There continues to be only a chance relationship between ex-
ecutions and homicides, and a statistically significant negative relation-
ship between the certainty of arrest and imprisonment and homicides.
Unlike the findings in Table 3, in Table 4 season becomes a significant
predictor of homicides, with a larger number of killings in December
and during the summer months. Although the results vary somewhat
for the season variable when possible higher-order autocorrelation
processes are explored, 66 the results for the sanction variables are not
altered. There remains only a chance relationship between executions
and homicides, and a significant negative relationship between arrest
and imprisonment and homicides.
C. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED EXECUTIONS
Up to this point we have considered solely the relationship between
executions and first-degree murders and homicides within the same
month, and the evidence is inconsistent with the deterrence hypothesis.
It is possible, however, that the deterrent effect of executions is not felt
primarily during the month of execution, but during the next month, or
the next few months. Unfortunately, proponents of deterrence theory
and capital punishment are not explicit about the proper time lag to
consider in an investigation such as ours. However, if the effect of execu-
tions is delayed, our analysis to this point does not provide an adequate
test of the deterrence hypothesis.
To explore this question, we next regress the number of monthly
(month t) first-degree murders and total criminal homicides against the
control variables, the number of executions and the execution dummy
variable for months t through t-12. This analysis takes into considera-
tion the possibility that the deterrent effect of capital punishment may
not be experienced until as much as twelve months after an execution.
The results of this analysis for first-degree murder are presented in Ta-
ble 5.
tern) autoregression (AUTO REG) routine is utilized. This procedure first estimates a model
using ordinary least squares and then computes autocorrelations up to the lag period re-
quested using the residuals from the OLS regression. The Yule-Walker equations are solved
to obtain estimates of the autoregressive parameters. Here we explore possible autoregressive
processes up to lag period t-12 months. Where significant (p < .05) autocorrelations result for
a lag period, the original data are appropriately transformed and parameters are re-estimated
using OLS regression.




OLS: NUMBER OF MONTHLY FIRST DEGREE MURDERS REGRESSED
AGAINST LAGGED NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, A LAGGED EXECUTION
DUMMY VARIABLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO,
1915-1921*
No. Executions Execution Dummy
Independent Variables B t/F B t/F
Population Density -. 001 -. 443 -. 000 -. 150
Public Assistance 2.458 .938 2.445 .893
Season .335 .417 .345 .431
Cert. of Arrest -. 026 -. 663 -. 037 -. 978
Cert. of Prison -. 112 -1.805a -. 106 -1.861a
Executions
Month t .468 .686 1.089 1.012
Month t-1 .882 1.168 2.713 2.373a
Month t-2 -. 527 -. 696 .836 .712
Month t-3 -. 452 -. 574 -. 480 -. 405
Month t-4 .750 .885 .317 .257
Month t-5 .503 .586 .821 .648
Month t-6 -. 673 -. 748 -1.076 -. 830
Month t-7 1.302 1.466 .674 .512
Month t-8 1.086 1.183 .831 .663
Month t-9 .673 .780 .620 .483
Month t-10 1.896 2.162a 1.148 .927
Month t-11 1.206 1.350 -. 224 -. 172
Month t-12 .620 .716 .445 .352
Constant 26.190 .756 17.370 .516
R2 .388 2.29b .379 2.21b
D.W . 1.914 1.893 _ Z
For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R 2 values, F values are reported.
a = p <.05
b = p < .01
Table 5 provides no consistent support for the deterrence hypothe-
sis for capital punishment. When the number of executions is consid-
ered, a minority (3/13) of the execution coefficients are negative and
none are statistically significant. In contrast, executions and murders
are positively associated for most lag periods (10), and the positive exe-
cution coefficient is significant for lag period t-10 months.6 7
A similar pattern holds when the execution dummy variable is ex-
amined. Again, only a minority (3/13) of the execution coefficients are




CORC: NUMBER OF MONTHLY FIRST DEGREE MURDERS RE-
GRESSED AGAINST LAGGED NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, A LAGGED
EXECUTION DUMMY VARIABLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS;
CHICAGO, 1915-1921*
No. Executions Execution Dummy
Independent Variable B t/F B t/F
Population Density -. 002 -1.180 -. 001 -. 783
Public Assistance .820 .399 .774 .331
Season .501 .638 .596 .755
Cert. of Arrest -. 033 -1.113 -. 049 -1.558
Cert. of Prison -. 147 -2.983b -. 135 -2.775b
Executions
Month t .431 .665 .996 .968
Month t-1 1.112 1.525 2.957 2.636b
Month t-2 -. 379 -. 521 1.004 .888
Month t-3 -. 440 -. 599 -. 443 -. 391
Month t-4 .792 .980 .405 .344
Month t-5 .663 .790 1.021 .842
Month t-6 -. 450 -. 512 -. 719 -. 583
Month t-7 1.544 1.811a .964 .774
Month t-8 1.262 1.430 1.168 .971
Month t-9 1.037 1.274 .984 .814
Month t-10 2.198 2.534b 1.527 1.256
Month t- 11 1.653 1.869a .494 .384
Month t-12 .698 .826 .559 .459
Constant 48.323 1.700 37.772 1.307
1R2 .509 3.74b .455 3.01b
* For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R 2 values, F values are reported.
a = p < .05
b = p < .01
negative, none are statistically significant, and one of the positive execu-
tion coefficients (for t-1) is significant at the .05 level. 68 Also, in both
analyses, the certainty of imprisonment, but not arrest, is significantly
related to first-degree murders.
69
The Durbin-Watson statistics reported in Table 5 indicate that the
OLS estimates are not seriously biased due to first-order serial correla-
68 B= 2.713; t = 2.373.
69 There is a high degree of correspondence between the number of monthly executions
and the execution dummy variables with the simple r coefficients ranging from .88 to .93 for




OLS: NUMBER OF MONTHLY HOMICIDES REGRESSED AGAINST
LAGGED NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, A LAGGED EXECUTION DUMMY
VARIABLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-1921*
No. Executions Execution Dummy
Independent Variable B t/F B t/F
Population Density -. 008 -2.669b -. 007 -2.433b
Public Assistance -3.429 -. 941 -3.485 -. 089
Season 1.531 1.369 1.366 1.194
Cert. of Arrest -. 129 -2.419b -. 143 -2.670b
Cert. of Prison -. 338 -3.933b -. 326 -4.00 lb
Executions
Month t .123 .130 1.028 .669
Month t-1 .399 .379 2.340 1.433
Month t-2 -. 906 -. 860 .603 .360
Month t-3 -1.162 -1.061 -1.343 -. 793
Month t-4 1.213 1.029 1.755 .997
Month t-5 .720 .602 .019 .010
Month t-6 -. 599 -. 479 -2.209 -1.193
Month t-7 2.150 1.741a 1.314 .699
Month t-8 2.120 1.659 1.374 .768
Month t-9 3.611 3.010b 4.076 2.223a
Month t-10 3.413 2.798b 3.032 1.716a
Month t-11 1.866 1.500 .639 .345
Month t-12 1.119 .928 1.455 .805
Constant 172.193 3.572b 156.876 3.262b
R2 .428 2.70b .389 2.30b
D.W. 1.912 1.715
For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R2 values, F values are reported.
a - p < .05
b = p < .01
tion. However, the possible bias resulting from higher order autocorre-
lation effects remains uncertain. To explore this question, lag periods as
far back as t-12 months were explored and a significant second-order
autocorrelation effect was detected. Table 6 reports re-estimated equa-
tions for first-degree murder correcting for the second-order autoregres-
sive process.
This reanalysis does not significantly alter the pattern of findings
from the OLS procedure. As before, a majority of the coefficients are
positive when both the actual number of executions (10/13) and the




CORC: NUMBER OF MONTHLY HOMICIDES REGRESSED AGAINST
LAGGED NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, A LAGGED EXECUTION DUMMY
VARIABLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-1921*
No. Executions Execution Dummy
Independent Variables B t/F B t/F
Population Density -. 004 -1.858a -. 003 -1.294
Public Assistance -. 036 -. 011 3.145 .874
Season 2.062 1.690a 2.139 1.876a
Cert. of Arrest -. 206 -4.235b -. 230 -3.428b
Cert. of Prison -. 171 -2.890b -. 115 -1.614
Executions
Month t .338 .392 2.433 1.920a
Month t-1 .248 .248 3.782 2.641b
Month t-2 -1.394 -1.405 1.518 1.034
Month t-3 -2.046 -2.033a -1.672 -1.158
Month t-4 .117 .114 .606 .393
Month t-5 -. 388 -. 370 -. 545 -. 317
Month t-6 -1.573 -1.411 -2.734 -1.487
Month t-7 1.096 .959 .120 .065
Month t-8 1.306 1.133 .664 .395
Month t-9 2.785 2.576b 2.156 1.278
Month t-10 3.159 2.65 1b 1.510 .914
Month t-11 1.896 1.534 -. 752 -. 437
Month t-12 .534 .470 -. 141 -. 091
Constant 96.273 3.293b 91.596 2.037a
R2 .491 3.48b .486 3.41b
For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R2 values, F values are reported.
a = p < .05
b =p <.01
only in that the number of executions is positively and significantly asso-
ciated with the number of first-degree murders for three lag periods (t-7,
t-10, t- 11) rather than just the one (t-10) as found in the OLS analysis.
Certainty of imprisonment is again significantly associated with first-
degree murders, as it is in the OLS analysis.
To further explore the possible delayed deterrent effect of execu-
tions, Table 7 reports the results of the analysis where the number of
monthly criminal homicides is regressed against both execution vari-
ables lagged from month t through month t-12. This analysis also does
not support the deterrence argument for capital punishment. Both cer-
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tainty of arrest and certainty of imprisonment are significantly, and neg-
atively, associated with the number of homicides, but none of the
negative execution coefficients are statistically significant. As before, the
vast majority of the execution coefficients are positive (21/26). They are
statistically significant for three lag periods for the number of executions
(t-7, t-9, t-10), and for two lag periods for the execution dummy variable
(t-9, t-10).
Again, to explore for possible autocorrelation effects, the analysis
reported in Table 7 for homicide was repeated considering the possibil-
ity of autocorrelation processes ranging from t-1 through t-12 months.
Surprisingly, and for reasons that are not clear, a significant ninth-order
autocorrelation effect was detected when both the number of executions
and the execution dummy factor were considered.
Table 8 reports the results of the analysis where a Cochrane-Orcutt
type of iterative procedure was used to correct for the ninth-order
autocorrelation effect. Comparison of the OLS and the CORC esti-
mates reported in Tables 7 and 8, respectively, reveals a similar pattern
of findings. When the number of executions is considered, most (9/13)
of the coefficients are again positive and two (t-9, t-10) are statistically
significant at the .01 level. Interestingly, however, one of the four nega-
tive execution coefficients (t-3) is also statistically significant (p<.05) in
the CORC analysis.
When the execution dummy variable is considered, a majority
(8/13) of the execution coefficients are also positive, and two (months t
and t-1) are statistically significant. This analysis also continues to sug-
gest the importance of the deterrent effect of arrest and imprisonment.
D. RESULTS OF A NONLINEAR ANALYSIS
The results up to this point clearly do not support the deterrence
hypothesis for capital punishment. Throughout the analysis, executions
and killings are generally positively associated, and significantly so in
some cases. In contrast, in only one isolated case-Table 8-is there a
significant inverse relationship between executions and killings. The
possibility exists, however, that these generally negative findings are the
result of improperly specifying the functional form of the relationship
between executions and the dependent variables. We have considered
only the possible linear relationship between executions and killings. It
may be that the actual form of the relationship between these two fac-
tors is nonlinear. Unfortunately, we can only speculate about this be-
cause proponents of the deterrence theory are silent on the question of
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the form of the relationship between executions and killings. 70 Typi-
cally, proponents simply argue that executions have a significant deter-
rent effect on murder.
In exploring this question, previous death penalty investigators
have examined one of three models of the relationship between execu-
tions and killings: (1) a linear additive model, such as the one used
here; 71 (2) a semi-log model, where the data for the dependent variable
are transformed;72 or (3) a double-log model, where both the figures for
the homicide and predictor variables are transformed. 73 These three
models have generally produced very consistent results. With but two
noted exceptions, 74 neither a significant linear nor nonlinear relation-
ship has been found between executions and homicides. Ehrlich, for ex-
ample, in his time-series analysis of nationally aggregated execution and
homicide data 75 found a statistically significant negative relationship be-
tween these two factors when a double-log model was used, but a non-
significant relationship when the execution and homicide data were
examined in their original form with a linear model.
To test for a possible nonlinear relationship between executions and
murders in Chicago, natural log transforms were performed on the mur-
der and homicide dependent variables and the above analysis (Tables 2-
8) was repeated. 76 Table 9 reports the results of the nonlinear analysis
where the transformed monthly murder and homicide data and both
execution variables are considered. This analysis is simply a replication
of that reported in Tables 2 and 3, but with the consideration of trans-
formed murder and homicide figures.
70 See, e.g., W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1979); E. VAN DEN HAAc, PUNISHING
CRIMINALS, supra note 47; Lehtinen, supra note 52; van den Haag; On Deterrence, supra note 47.
71 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 17; Passell & Taylor, The Deterrence Controversy: A Reconsidera-
ion of Time-Series Evidence, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 359 (H. Bedau &
C. Pierce eds. 1976).
72 Bailey, supra note 10; Bailey, Death Penalty for Murder in Ohio,supra note 21; Bailey, Death
Penalty for Murder in California, supra note 21; Bailey, Death Penalty in North Carolina, supra note
21.
73 Erlich, supra note 14; Ehrlich, supra note 20.
74 Ehrlich, supra note 14; Yunker, supra note 16.
75 Ehrlich, supra note 14.
76 A semi-log model was used here, not a double-log function as in the Ehrlich study,
because of the number of months (65/84) in the Chicago time series where there were no
executions. We do not view this as a major limitation, however. First, and obviously, the log
of zero cannot be taken. Second, when data points have zero values that are theoretically
meaningful (in this case, no executions), it makes no sense to follow Ehrlich's practice of
arbitrarily substituting non-zero values for zeroes so that the data can be log-transformed.
Third, there is no a priori reason to expect that a double-log function provides a better test of
the deterrent effect of executions than a semi-log model. In short, a semi-log model seems like
a reasonable alternative to consider, although we well recognize that it is just one of a number
of nonlinear functions that might be explored. Without some theoretical rationale, however,
the mass exploration of alternative nonlinear functions would simply be a fishing expedition.
[Vol. 74
MURDER IN CHICA GO












C M - ..
w) CN t 114.C1- (D t
w rX r- 0) Lo CO cl 0 o0
















The results for the sanction variables exactly parallel the earlier
findings. For first-degree murder, there is a nonsignificant positive rela-
tionship between both execution measures and the dependent variable.
For homicide, the coefficients are mixed in sign for the two execution
variables, but regardless of their sign, none are statistically significant.
In contrast, the certainty of arrest and imprisonment are negatively, and
significantly, associated with both types of killings when each execution
measure is considered.
To test for problems of serial correlation, the analysis reported in
Table 9 was repeated with autocorrelation processes being explored
with lags as far back as month t-12. A significant fifth-order autocorre-
lation effect was detected for murder, and a significant fourth-order
autocorrelation effect for homicide, but corrections for these effects do
not alter the results for the sanction variables. There remains only a
low-positive or a low-negative, and chance, relationship between execu-
tions and killings, and a significant negative association between the cer-
tainty of arrest and imprisonment and both dependent variables.
Table 10 reports the results of the analysis where the possible
delayed effect of executions is considered using the transformed murder
and homicide data. This is a replication of the analysis reported in Ta-
bles 5 and 7 but with alternative transformed murder and homicide
figures.
For both types of offenses, the findings are similar to the previous
linear analysis. For murder I, none of the negative execution coefficients
are statistically significant. In contrast, the number of murders is posi-
tively and significantly associated with the number of executions for one
lag period (month t-1). Similarly, for homicide, a minority of the execu-
tion coefficients are negative and none are statistically significant. Also
contrary to the deterrence hypothesis, homicides are positively and sig-
nificantly associated with the number of executions for four lag periods
(t-7, t-9, t- 11, t-12) and the execution dummy variable for two lag peri-
ods (t- 9, t- 10). The lag periods for the significant execution results par-
allel the linear analysis. Also consistent with the linear analysis, Table
10 continues to provide evidence of the deterrent effect of arrest and
imprisonment for both types of killings.
The Durbin-Watson values reported in Table 10 suggest that the t-
ratios for the execution and other variables are not seriously biased due
to first-order serial correlation, but higher-order autocorrelation
problems remain a possibility. Indeed, examination reveals a significant
second-order autocorrelation effect in the murder I analysis when each
execution variable is considered, and a significant fourth-order autocor-
relation effect in the homicide analysis for both execution variables.
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When the four models presented in Table 10 are re-estimated cor-
recting for autocorrelation, the results are equally inconsistent with the
deterrence hypothesis. Again, only a minority of the execution coeffi-
cients are negative, and none are statistically significant for either first-
degree murder or homicide. For murder I, three of the positive execu-
tion coefficients are statistically significant (t-1, t-7, t-10) and one of the
execution dummy coefficients is significant (t- 1). For homicide, only one
of the execution dummy coefficients is statistically significant (t-9). Four
of the coefficients are statistically significant when the number of execu-
tions is considered (t-8, t-9, t-10, t- 11). As contrary as these findings are
to the deterrence hypothesis for executions, the results of this reanalysis
are quite consistent with the hypothesized deterrent effect of arrest and
imprisonment.
To briefly summarize, for the period under investigation, we find
no evidence that capital punishment provided an effective deterrent to
first-degree murder in Chicago. Where the deterrence model poses a
significant inverse relationship between executions and capital killings,
our analysis shows that these two factors are most commonly positively
associated. This pattern holds for the linear and nonlinear models for
both execution measures, and also when the majority of the execution
lag periods are considered.
When a more general category of homicide is considered, the results
are very similar. Although the findings differ somewhat for the linear
and nonlinear models, the basic pattern is the same, whether the actual
number of executions or the execution dummy variable is considered.
Contrary to the deterrence hypothesis, executions are more typically as-
sociated with a higher rather than a lower number of criminal homi-
cides. This positive relationship is statistically significant for some lag
periods for either or both of the execution measures in the linear
(months t, t-1, t-7, t-9, t-10) and nonlinear analysis (months t-7, t-8, t-9,
t-10, t-11).
E. THE BRUTALIZATION HYPOTHESIS
On balance, these findings for both murder and homicide seem
consistent with Bowers and Pierce's claim 77 that the effect of executions
is to increase, not decrease, killings. 78 This argument-that capital pun-
77 Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization, supra note 21.
78 Rather than indicating a brutalization effect, the generally positive association between
executions and both types of killings might be interpreted as evidence that the level of murder
has a positive effect on the "demand" for executions. Brier & Fienberg, supra note 17, at 179;
Friedman, supra note 17, at 69. To illustrate, in Community A, which has a high murder rate,
fear and public outrage may result in a higher number of convicted murderers being sen-
tenced to death and executed than in Community B, where the murder rate is low and is not
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ishment, because of its "brutalization effect," actually contributes to the
murder problem-has a long history in the criminology literature.
79
Like the deterrence theory, however, the "brutalization" hypothesis is
not well developed theoretically. For example, this body of literature is
virtually silent on such basic matters as the magnitude of the positive
relationship to expect between executions and resulting homicides, and
the nature of the temporal relationship-possible lag-between execu-
tions and resulting homicides. Proponents of the brutalization hypothe-
sis are generally no more specific about these two matters than to argue
that executions encourage more murders than they prevent and that the
impact of executions is probably immediate and rather short-term. 80
With only such a general theoretical framework to test against, it is
not altogether clear whether our findings should be interpreted as sup-
porting the brutalization argument. For example, the brutalization the-
ory hypothesizes a positive relationship between executions and killings,
and this pattern generally holds for our data. However, for both first-
degree murder and total criminal homicides, the execution coefficients
are negative for some lag periods.
Second, the size of the positive execution coefficients vary consider-
ably by lag period, and this variation does not correspond to what the
brutalization argument might lead us to expect. Whereas one might
predict that the impact of executions on killings would be immediate
and short-term, the execution coefficients more often tend to be statisti-
cally significant, and slightly larger in size, for the more extended lag
seen as such a serious problem. Similarly, within the same community over time, changes in
the level of murder may influence the demand for executions.
While the "demand for executions" hypothesis is plausible and could produce a positive
relationship between executions and killings, this argument cannot account for our findings
for Chicago. Because of the typical delay of at least one year between the commission of a
murder, conviction, and execution, Bailey, supra note 10, at 1314-15; Ehrlich, supra note 14, at
407, the demand hypothesis cannot explain the positive relationship between executions and
killings when both factors are examined for month t (Tables 2, 3, 4 and 9). Similarly, it makes
no sense to argue that the level of homicides during month t could have influenced the level
of monthly executions during the previous one-year period (Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10).
79 C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1764); L. HAMILTON, MEMOIRS,
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF ROBERT RANTOUL, JR. 474 (1854); Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence
or Brutalization, supra note 21; Diamond, Murder and the Death Penalty:. A Case Report, in CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 445 (1976); Glaser, Capital Punishment-Deterrent or
Stimulus to Murder? Our Unexamined Deaths and Penalties, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 317 (1979);
Graves, A Doctor Looks at Capital Punishment, 10 J. LOMA LINDA U. SCH. MED. 137 (1956);
Marx, CapitalPunishment, reprinted in L. FEURER, KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS, BA-
SIC WRITINGS IN POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 485 (1959); Solomon, Capital Punishment as Sui-
cide and as Murder, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 432.
80 Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization, supra note 21. The fact that murder rates are
generally higher in death penalty than abolition states is frequently cited by proponents of




periods of months t-6 through t-12. That is, for some unknown reason,
it appears that executions had a more substantial delayed than immedi-
ate brutalization effect on Chicago first-degree murders and criminal
homicides.
Finally, the results vary somewhat depending upon whether the ac-
tual number of executions or the execution dummy variable is consid-
ered. For murder I, the dummy variable for month t-1 is positively and
significantly associated with the number of killings, but this pattern does
not hold for the actual number of executions lagged by one month. In
contrast, first-degree murders are significantly and positively associated
with the actual number of executions when some more distant lag peri-
ods are considered (months t-7, t-10, t- 11), but this pattern does not hold
for the dummy execution variable for these longer time lags. Similarly,
but to a lesser extent, the findings for the two execution measures are
also not uniform by lag period when total criminal homicides are
examined.
In light of these mixed findings, one might conclude that this analy-
sis also provides no support for the brutalization hypothesis for capital
punishment. This conclusion would be consistent with Sellin's claim
that "the death penalty-in law or practice-does not influence homi-
cide death rates,"8' and the findings of a number of studies showing that
executions and murder are largely independent factors. As discussed
above, however, most previous investigations are not without serious
limitations, some of which we have attempted to overcome in this analy-
sis. In addition, the dominant pattern of a positive relationship between
executions and killings found throughout the analysis cannot be
ignored.
If executions and killings were, indeed, simply random events, we
would expect (1) no association between these two factors, or (2) a slight
positive or negative relationship between these two factors, due to sam-
pling error, with the positive and negative execution coefficients being
roughly equal in number, and averaging to zero when summed. This
hypothetical random pattern of executions and killings does not fit the
Chicago data. To the contrary, when the findings for first-degree mur-
der are combined from Tables 5, 6 and 10, fifty-eight of seventy-eight
(74.4%) of the execution coefficients are positive. Similarly, for criminal
homicide, fifty-nine of seventy-eight (75.6%) of the execution coefficients
are positive. For both first-degree murder and -homicide the number of
positive execution coefficients is significantly different from chance at
beyond the .01 level.
Furthermore, the observed positive and negative execution coeffi-
81 T. SELLIN, supra note 3, at 138.
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cients do not sum to zero for either type of killing for either of the execu-
tion measures. When first-degree murder and the number of executions
are considered over the thirteen lag periods (Table 5), the execution co-
efficients sum to +7.734. The execution dummy coefficients sum to
+7.714 for the thirteen lag periods for murder I. For homicide (Table
7), when the number of executions are considered, the coefficients sum
to + 14.067 over the thirteen lag periods. For homicide for the dummy
execution variable, the thirteen coefficients sum to + 14.083. These im-
balances in a positive direction are beyond what one would expect if
executions and killings were simply random events.
V. CONCLUSION
It is conceivable that there is at least some degree of merit to both
the deterrence and brutalization arguments for capital punishment. To
some degree, and for some segment of the population, executions may
deter killings. Conversely, to some degree, and for some other segment
of the population, executions may encourage killings. In other words, at
the same time that executions may encourage some persons to kill, they
may discourage others from committing murder.
To differentiate the possible deterrent and brutalization effects of
capital punishment, it is necessary to (1) develop independent indicators
of the deterrent and brutalization effects of executions rather than sim-
ply rely upon the overall number or rate of killings as a dependent vari-
able, and/or (2) try to identify sub-segments of the population that are
differentially affected by executions due to deterrence and brutalization,
and then examine their differential involvement in murder. Due to data
constraints and the crude nature of both the deterrence and brutaliza-
tion arguments, such an analysis is not possible at this time. Despite this
limitation, however, one can still legitimately ask: What is the net effect
of executions on killings? Overall, is the effect of executions to increase
or decrease killings? And, in the context of the current study, was the
effect of executions to increase or decrease Chicago killings?
In line with the brutalization argument, this analysis suggests that
the net effect of executions may well have been to increase, not decrease,
Chicago first-degree murders and total criminal homicides. This finding
is consistent with a number of early and more recent investigations of
the brutalization effect of capital punishment in this country82 and is
only partially at odds with one study.8 3 In addition, our findings are
82 Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization, supra note 21; Graves, supra note 79; King,
supra note 21; Savitz, A tua'y in Capital Punishment, 49 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
Sci. 338 (1958).
83 Phillips reported that the initial effect of the highly publicized execution of two dozen
notorious London murderers (1875-1905) was to reduce killings, which was then balanced by
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consistent with the fact that not a single reputable study has yet shown
that capital punishment is an effective deterrent to murder. Deterrence
may indeed be an indispensable cornerstone of our criminal justice sys-
tem, but when it comes to murder and capital punishment, this theory
and justification for punishment lacks empirical support.
an unusual increase in murders, for a net effect of close to zero. Phillips, The Deterrent Efe t of
Capital Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM. J. Soc. 139, 147 (1980). Because
Phillips chose to examine only very atypical killers whose executions received inordinate me-
dia attention, it remains unclear how well his findings can be generalized to more typical
offenders and executions, even in London. Furthermore, Phillips well recognizes that, for a
variety of theoretical and methodological reasons, his findings may not be generalizable to
contemporary America.
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